To cooperate or to defect? Altruism and reputation

被引:22
作者
Kulakowski, Krzysztof [1 ]
Gawronski, Przemyslaw [1 ]
机构
[1] AGH Univ Sci & Technol, Fac Phys & Appl Comp Sci, PL-30059 Krakow, Poland
关键词
Cooperation; Agents; Computer simulation; Altruism; Reputation;
D O I
10.1016/j.physa.2009.05.001
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
The basic difficulty in cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also oil the co-player's reputation. We find that players with positive altruism cooperate and meet cooperation. In this approach, payoffs are not relevant. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:3581 / 3584
页数:4
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