GOOD NEWS FOR MORAL ERROR THEORISTS: A MASTER ARGUMENT AGAINST COMPANIONS IN GUILT STRATEGIES

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to companions in guilt' arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a companion' and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable companion' for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists.