SIMULTANEOUS STATE ESTIMATION AND LEARNING IN REPEATED COURNOT GAMES

被引:6
作者
Kebriaei, Hamed [1 ]
Ahmadabadi, Majid Nili [1 ,2 ]
Rahimi-Kian, Ashkan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tehran, Control & Intelligent Proc Ctr Excellence, Sch ECE, Tehran, Iran
[2] Inst Res Fundamental Sci, Sch Cognit Sci, Tehran, Iran
关键词
SIMPLE DYNAMIC-MODEL; PEOPLE PLAY GAMES; BIDDING STRATEGIES; AGENTS;
D O I
10.1080/08839514.2014.862774
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
The aim of this article is to propose that an intelligent agent can be able to decide properly in an incomplete information repeated Cournot game. The market model and the competitors' decision models are not known to the players. The proposed agent employs a combination of the k-nearest neighbor (KNN) method and the Bayes classifier to predict the next action of its rivals, using the market decision history. The agent takes the predicted actions as an estimate of its next state and learns the expected payoff of its state-action pairs interactively using the reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. The results of the proposed agent's competition with two benchmark competitors in different simulated Cournot games are presented. The simulation results show that the proposed agent can significantly earn more payoffs in comparison with the two benchmark agents.
引用
收藏
页码:66 / 89
页数:24
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