From a rationalist perspective, this paper analyzes the current nuclear stalemate between the United States and North Korea. Using a simple game theoretical model, this paper shows that the current deadlock emanates from a commitment problem, Pyongyang's concern that the United States will be unable to commit itself to following through on an agreement once Pyongyang has dismantled its nuclear programs, because Pyongyang's accommodation of the demand for denuclearization would imply not only the increased vulnerability of the North to U.S. military presence but also the undermining of its future bargaining power relative to that of the United States. Currently, the lack of a reliable enforcing mechanism to guarantee the implementation of a nuclear deal generates this commitment problem, making it more difficult for both sides to strike a deal. Thus, this paper offers three policy alternatives to minimize the commitment problem as a prerequisite to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and making progress towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. First, minimizing the commitment problem requires bringing in a third party who is capable of securing the implementation of an agreement. Besides bringing in a third party, this paper also proposes two other ways to make reneging costly. The final agreement for a nuclear deal must be a legally binding agreement such as a treaty that requires U.S. domestic legislative approval and finally, North Korea must relinquish any economic aid from the United States to reduce the possibility that a nuclear deal made between them does not cause any U.S. domestic backlash against the deal.
