Regulation, competition, and liberalization

被引:159
作者
Armstrong, Mark [1 ]
Sappington, David E. A.
机构
[1] UCL, Sappington, England
[2] Univ Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jel.44.2.325
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance Of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies.
引用
收藏
页码:325 / 366
页数:42
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