Belief's minimal rationality

被引：12

作者：

Bergamaschi Ganapini, Marianna ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Union Coll, Schenectady, NY 12308 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2020年 / 177卷 / 11期

关键词：

Belief; Rationality; Coherence; Assertion; Cognitive dissonance; COGNITIVE-DISSONANCE; BIASED ASSIMILATION; SELECTIVE EXPOSURE; IMAGINATION; REPRESENTATION; DEVALUATION; PREFERENCE; DELUSIONS; KNOWLEDGE; ATTITUDES;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-019-01369-y

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs' irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that beliefs necessarily preserve at least a minimal level of rationality. This view offers a plausible picture of what makes belief unique and will help us to set beliefs apart from other cognitive attitudes (e.g. imagination, acceptance).

引用

页码：3263 / 3282

页数：20

共 118 条

[1]

Adler J.E., 2002, BELIEFS OWN ETHICS, DOI DOI 10.7551/MITPRESS/1554.001.0001

[2] IMPLICIT PERSONALITY THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL-DATA - BIASED ASSIMILATION, BELIEF PERSEVERANCE AND CHANGE, AND COVARIATION DETECTION SENSITIVITY [J].