A dynamic model of residential segregation

被引：123

作者：

Zhang, JF ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Publ Policy Inst Calif, San Francisco, CA 94111 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY | 2004年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

potential game; stochastic stability; agent-based simulation; residential segregation;

D O I：

10.1080/00222500490480202

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

Using dimes and pennies on a checkerboard, Schelling (1971, 1978) studied the link between residential preferences and segregational neighborhood patterns. While his approach clearly has methodological advantages in studying the dynamics of residential segregation, Schelling's checkerboard model has never been rigorously analyzed. We propose an extension of the Schelling model that incorporates economic variables. Using techniques recently developed in stochastic evolutionary game theory, we mathematically characterize the model's long-term dynamics.

引用

页码：147 / 170

页数：24