Communication and coordination in social networks

被引:152
作者
Chwe, MSY [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-937X.00118
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I model people in a coordination game who use a communication network to tell each other their willingness to participate. The minimal sufficient networks for coordination can be interpreted as placing people into a hierarchy of social roles or "stages": "initial adopters", then "followers", and so on down to "late adopters". A communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways: by informing each stage about earlier stages, and by creating common knowledge within each stage. We then consider two examples: first we show that "low dimensional" networks can be better for coordination even though they have far fewer links than "high dimensional" networks; second we show that wide dispersion of "insurgents",:people predisposed toward participation, can be good for coordination but too much dispersion can be bad.
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页码:1 / 16
页数:16
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