The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring

被引：136

作者：

Acemoglu, Daron ^{[1
,2
,3
,4
]}

Hassan, Tarek A. ^{[2
,3
,5
]}

Tahoun, Ahmed ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] CEPR, Washington, DC USA

[4] CIFAR, Toronto, ON, Canada

[5] Boston Univ, 270 Bay State Rd, Boston, MA 02215 USA

[6] London Business Sch, London, England

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2018年 / 31卷 / 01期

关键词：

POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS; GREAT REFORM ACT; NETWORKS EVIDENCE; REVOLUTION; INFORMATION; INSTABILITY; INVESTMENT; ELECTIONS; FRANCHISE; DEMOCRACY;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhx086

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Unprecedented street protests brought down Mubarak's government and ushered in an era of competition between three rival political groups in Egypt. Using daily variation in the number of protesters, we document that more intense protests are associated with lower stock market valuations for firms connected to the group currently in power relative to non-connected firms, but have no impact on the relative valuations of firms connected to rival groups. These results suggest that street protests serve as a partial check on political rent-seeking. General discontent expressed on Twitter predicts protests but has no direct effect on valuations.

引用

页码：1 / 42

页数：42

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