The value of political connection: Evidence from the 2011 Egyptian revolution

被引:20
作者
Dang, Vinh Q. T. [1 ]
So, Erin P. K. [2 ]
Yan, Isabel K. M. [3 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Political connection; Firm value; Financial constraint; Propping; Egypt; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; DEATHS; CONSTRAINTS; INVESTMENT; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; BOARDS; STOCK; COST;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2017.10.027
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We manually construct a list of Egyptian exchange-traded firms that were connected to President Mubarak and use the sudden collapse of his 30-year regime in the 2011 Arab Spring, a natural experiment exogenous to Egyptian firms, to measure the value of this political connection. We find that connection to Mubarak had contributed significantly, about 22.4%, to firm value. Moreover, state-ownership and connection to Mubarak remained separate sources of political capital under the entrenched autocracy. Mubarak-connected firms experienced lower financial constraint before the collapse of the regime and debt-induced equity propping at the peak of the 2008 global crisis.
引用
收藏
页码:238 / 257
页数:20
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