The value of political connection: Evidence from the 2011 Egyptian revolution

被引:21
作者
Dang, Vinh Q. T. [1 ]
So, Erin P. K. [2 ]
Yan, Isabel K. M. [3 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Political connection; Firm value; Financial constraint; Propping; Egypt; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; DEATHS; CONSTRAINTS; INVESTMENT; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; BOARDS; STOCK; COST;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2017.10.027
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We manually construct a list of Egyptian exchange-traded firms that were connected to President Mubarak and use the sudden collapse of his 30-year regime in the 2011 Arab Spring, a natural experiment exogenous to Egyptian firms, to measure the value of this political connection. We find that connection to Mubarak had contributed significantly, about 22.4%, to firm value. Moreover, state-ownership and connection to Mubarak remained separate sources of political capital under the entrenched autocracy. Mubarak-connected firms experienced lower financial constraint before the collapse of the regime and debt-induced equity propping at the peak of the 2008 global crisis.
引用
收藏
页码:238 / 257
页数:20
相关论文
共 42 条
[1]  
Acemoglu D., 2014, 20665 NAT BUR EC RES
[2]  
Acemoglu Daron., 2011, Why Nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty
[3]   Politically-Embedded Cronyism: The Case of Post-Liberalization Egypt [J].
Adly, Amr Ismail .
BUSINESS AND POLITICS, 2009, 11 (04)
[4]   Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks [J].
Blau, Benjamin M. ;
Brough, Tyler J. ;
Thomas, Diana W. .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2013, 37 (08) :3007-3017
[5]   Political connections of newly privatized firms [J].
Boubakri, Narjess ;
Cosset, Jean-Claude ;
Saffar, Walid .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2008, 14 (05) :654-673
[6]   Financial reform and financing constraints: Some evidence from listed Chinese firms [J].
Chan, Kenneth S. ;
Dang, Vinh Q. T. ;
Yan, Isabel K. M. .
CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2012, 23 (02) :482-497
[7]   Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence [J].
Chen, Charles J. P. ;
Li, Zengquan ;
Su, Xijia ;
Sun, Zheng .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2011, 17 (02) :229-243
[8]   Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong [J].
Cheung, Yan-Leung ;
Rau, P. Raghavendra ;
Stouraitis, Aris .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 82 (02) :343-386
[9]   Investment opportunity set, political connection and business policies of private enterprises in China [J].
Chow C.K.W. ;
Fung M.K.Y. ;
Lam K.C.K. ;
Sami H. .
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2012, 38 (3) :367-389
[10]  
Elaasar Aladdin., 2009, The Last Pharaoh: Mubarak and the Uncertain Future of Egypt in the Obama Age