Second-Best Liability Rules, Loss-Prevention Incentives, and Efficiency

被引:1
作者
Lee, Kangoh [1 ]
机构
[1] San Diego State Univ, Dept Econ, San Diego, CA 92182 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 2014年 / 170卷 / 02期
关键词
ECONOMIC-THEORY; LITIGATION; CARE;
D O I
10.1628/093245614X13783876326580
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper compares two liability rules, strict liability and the negligence rule, in terms of loss-prevention investment and social welfare when individuals are risk-averse and policymakers do not have lump-sum transfers at their disposal. If the damage payment made by the injurer to the victim fully compensates for the loss, loss prevention is higher under the negligence rule but social welfare is higher under strict liability. If the damage payment partially compensates for the loss, loss prevention and social welfare both tend to be higher under the negligence rule.
引用
收藏
页码:275 / 295
页数:21
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