Part two: The effectiveness of international environmental regimes - Problem structure, institutional design, and the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements

被引:82
作者
Mitchell, Ronald B. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oregon, Dept Polit Sci, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/glep.2006.6.3.72
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
To accurately assess the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements requires that we pay greater attention to how problem structures influence both institutional design and the outcomes we use to evaluate institutional effects. Analyzing multiple agreements allows us to move beyond claims that an agreement was influential to claims regarding which variables explain that influence, to examine how institutional influence depends on other factors, and to evaluate an agreement's effectiveness relative to other agreements and non-institutional influences. Accounting for problem structure is crucial to such endeavors because problem structure variables may be alternatives to or interact with institutional variables and because institutional design is endogenous to the problem structure-outcome relationship. The shortcomings related to incorporating problem structure in extant effectiveness research can be overcome through four strategies: carefully describing analytically useful variation in problem structure, selecting cases to limit variation in problem structure, evaluating problem structure variables and their influence on design and behavior, and evaluating effectiveness in terms appropriate to the problem structure.
引用
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页码:72 / +
页数:20
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