Defending intentionalist accounts of self-deception

被引：17

作者：

Bermudez, JL

机构：

来源：

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES | 1997年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S0140525X97270032

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

引用

页码：107 / &