A Peer-to-Peer Content-Distribution Scheme Resilient to Key Leakage

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have attracted increasing attention in the distribution of large-volume and frequently accessed content. In this paper, we mainly consider the problem of key leakage in secure P2P content distribution. In secure content distribution, content is encrypted so that only legitimate users can access the content. Usually, users (peers) cannot be fully trusted in a P2P network because malicious ones might leak their decryption keys. If the redistribution of decryption keys occurs, copyright holders may incur great losses caused by free riders who access content without purchasing it. To decrease the damage caused by the key leakage, the individualization of encrypted content is necessary. The individualization means that a different (set of) decryption key(s) is required for each user to access content. In this paper, we propose a P2P content distribution scheme resilient to the key leakage that achieves the individualization of encrypted content. We show the feasibility of our scheme by conducting a large-scale P2P experiment in a real network.