Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities

被引：299

作者：

Piketty, Thomas ^{[1
]}

Saez, Emmanuel ^{[2
]}

Stantcheva, Stefanie ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Paris Sch Econ, F-75014 Paris, France

[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

[3] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY | 2014年 / 6卷 / 01期

关键词：

MARGINAL TAX RATES; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; TAXABLE INCOME; SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM; CEO COMPENSATION; PAY; HISTORY; LUCK;

D O I：

10.1257/pol.6.1.230

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper derives optimal top tax rate formulas in a model where top earners respond to taxes through three channels: labor supply, tax avoidance, and compensation bargaining. The optimal top tax rate increases when there are zero-sum compensation-bargaining effects. We present empirical evidence consistent with bargaining effects. Top tax rate cuts are associated with top one percent pretax income shares increases but not higher economic growth. US CEO "pay for luck" is quantitatively more prevalent when top tax rates are low. International CEO pay levels are negatively correlated with top tax rates, even controlling for firms' characteristics and performance.

引用

页码：230 / 271

页数：42

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