Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: Game-Theoretic Analysis

被引：0

作者：

Vasin, Alexander ^{[1
]}

Kartunova, Polina ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Lomonosov Moscow State Univ, Moscow, Russia

来源：

CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL VIII | 2015年 / 8卷

基金：

俄罗斯基础研究基金会;

关键词：

Game theory; auctions; market power; social welfare; ELECTRICITY SPOT MARKET; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; EQUILIBRIA; ENTRY;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

This paper discusses results on Nash equilibrium and its refinements for several variants of the architecture for oligopolistic markets of homogeneous goods. For different kinds of one-stage and two-stage auctions, we compare the game-theoretic solution with the competitive equilibrium and estimate the loss of social welfare due to producers market power. We conclude on the optimal architecture of the market.

引用

页码：315 / 335

页数：21

共 34 条

[1]

Abolmasov A., 2002, MARKET POWER POWER M

[2] COURNOT COMPETITION, FORWARD MARKETS AND EFFICIENCY [J].