Why Do Firms in Customer-Supplier Relationships Hold More Cash?

被引:22
作者
Bae, Kee-Hong [1 ]
Wang, Jin [2 ]
机构
[1] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[2] Wilfrid Laurier Univ, Sch Business & Econ, 75 Univ Ave West, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada
关键词
ECONOMETRIC EVALUATION ESTIMATOR; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; FINANCIAL POLICY; CORPORATE; DETERMINANTS; BEHAVIOR; DEBT;
D O I
10.1111/irfi.12058
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A firm is in customer-supplier relationships when its business depends on a small number of major customers/ suppliers. In this paper, we provide evidence that relationship-specific investments undertaken by firms in customer-supplier relationships are associated with high cash holdings in these firms. The evidence is consistent with the prediction of Titman's stakeholder theory that a firm relying on relationship-specific investments maintains a high cash reserve as a cushion to sustain its relationship-specific investments when negative shocks occur. Our findings suggest that relationship-specific investments are important determinants of the precautionary motive to hold cash.
引用
收藏
页码:489 / 520
页数:32
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