Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities

被引：51

作者：

Ashlagi, Itai ^{[1
]}

Braverman, Mark ^{[2
]}

Hassidim, Avinatan ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

[3] Bar Ilan Univ, IL-52900 Ramat Gan, Israel

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2014年 / 62卷 / 04期

基金：

以色列科学基金会; 美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

INCENTIVES; EFFICIENCY; SUBSTITUTES; CONVERGENCE; EQUILIBRIUM;

D O I：

10.1287/opre.2014.1276

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets, a stable matching may not exist. We study large random matching markets with couples. We introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market, a stable matching will be found with high probability. If however, the number of couples grows at a linear rate, with constant probability (not depending on the market size), no stable matching exists. Our results explain data from the market for psychology interns.

引用

页码：713 / 732

页数：20

共 32 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1990, Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monographs

[2]

Biro P., 2011, J EXPT ALGORITHMICS, V16

[3] Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms [J].