Bayesian Occam's Razor Is a Razor of the People

被引:24
作者
Blanchard, Thomas [1 ]
Lombrozo, Tania [2 ]
Nichols, Shaun [3 ]
机构
[1] Illinois Wesleyan Univ, Dept Philosophy, 205 Beecher St, Bloomington, IL 61701 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Psychol, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Philosophy, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
关键词
Simplicity; Flexibility; Bayesianism; Probability; Explanation; GENERIC PRIORS; INFERENCE; EXPLANATIONS; PROBABILITY; SIMPLICITY; ACCOUNT; MODEL;
D O I
10.1111/cogs.12573
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Occam's razorthe idea that all else being equal, we should pick the simpler hypothesisplays a prominent role in ordinary and scientific inference. But why are simpler hypotheses better? One attractive hypothesis known as Bayesian Occam's razor (BOR) is that more complex hypotheses tend to be more flexiblethey can accommodate a wider range of possible dataand that flexibility is automatically penalized by Bayesian inference. In two experiments, we provide evidence that people's intuitive probabilistic and explanatory judgments follow the prescriptions of BOR. In particular, people's judgments are consistent with the two most distinctive characteristics of BOR: They penalize hypotheses as a function not only of their numbers of free parameters but also as a function of the size of the parameter space, and they penalize those hypotheses even when their parameters can be tuned to fit the data better than comparatively simpler hypotheses.
引用
收藏
页码:1345 / 1359
页数:15
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