Two-echelon manufacturer-retailer supply chain strategies with price, quality, and promotional effort sensitive demand

This study deals with the two-layer supply chain model of one manufacturer and one retailer for a single commodity where market demand is assumed to be dependent on selling price, quality of the products, and promotional effort of the retailer. We investigate the behavior of the supply chain under centralized, manufacturer Stackelberg, conditional manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, conditional retailer Stackelberg, and vertical Nash model structure. The nature of the above models provides great insights to a firm's manager for achieving optimal strategy in a competitive marketing system. Quite often, not all items produced in a firm are of perfect quality; some are perfect (conforming) quality and others are imperfect (nonconforming) quality. The nonconforming products are sold in a secondary shop or by other retailers. The procurement cost of finished products depends on the quality of the products due to more investment in advanced technology, better raw materials, and skilled labor, etc. The warranty policy for the products is also imposed to attract the customers to buy more. Here, both members (manufacturer and retailer) jointly share the cost of the warranty policy. The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal selling price and promotional effort of the retailer, while the optimal wholesale price and quality of the products are determined by the manufacturer so that the above strategies are maximized. Finally, numerical examples with sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are illustrated to investigate the proposed model.