LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH

被引:29
作者
Anderlini, Luca
Felli, Leonardo
Immordino, Giovanni
Riboni, Alessandro
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[2] London Sch Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
[3] Univ Salerno, Salerno, Italy
[4] Univ Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
关键词
COMMITMENT; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1111/iere.12023
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation, and growth. We compare a rigid legal system (the law is set before the technological innovation) and a flexible one (the law is set after observing the new technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation, and output growth at intermediate stages of technological developmentperiods when legal change is needed. The rigid system is preferable at early stages of technological development, when commitment problems are severe. For mature technologies, the two legal systems are equivalent. We find that rigid legal systems may induce excessive R&D investment.
引用
收藏
页码:937 / 956
页数:20
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