Board composition and CEO power

被引：128

作者：

Baldenius, Tim ^{[1
]}

Melumad, Nahum ^{[2
]}

Meng, Xiaojing ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU Stern, New York, NY 10012 USA

[2] Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 112卷 / 01期

关键词：

Corporate governance; CEO power; Board composition; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT; COMMUNICATION; CONSEQUENCES; DETERMINANTS; AUTHORITY; DIRECTORS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study the optimal composition of corporate boards. Directors can be either monitoring or advisory types. Monitoring constrains the empire-building tendency of chief executive officers (CEOs). If shareholders control the board nomination process, a non-monotonic relation ensues between agency problems and board composition. To preempt CEO entrenchment, shareholders may assemble an adviser-heavy board. If a powerful CEO influences the nomination process, this may result in a more monitor-heavy board. Regulations strengthening the monitoring role of boards can be harmful in precisely those cases in which agency problems are severe or in which CEO entrenchment is a threat to corporate governance. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：53 / 68

页数：16

共 36 条

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