Target revaluation after failed takeover attempts: Cash versus stock

被引:59
作者
Malmendier, Ulrike [1 ,2 ]
Opp, Marcus M. [2 ]
Saidi, Farzad [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[3] Univ Cambridge, Judge Business Sch, Cambridge CB2 1AG, England
关键词
Mergers and acquisitions; Synergies; Revaluation; Medium of exchange; TENDER OFFERS; CORPORATE PERFORMANCE; CREATE VALUE; RETURNS; MARKET; MERGERS; ACQUISITION; INFORMATION; VALUATION; EXCHANGE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.013
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Cash- and stock-financed takeover bids induce strikingly different target revaluations. We exploit detailed data on unsuccessful takeover bids between 1980 and 2008, and we show that targets of cash offers are revalued on average by 15% after deal failure, whereas stock targets return to their pre-announcement levels. The differences in revaluation do not revert over longer horizons. We find no evidence that future takeover activities or operational changes explain these differences. While the targets of failed cash and stock offers are both more likely to be acquired over the following eight years than matched control firms, no differences exist between cash and stock targets, either in the timing or in the value of future offers. Similarly, we cannot detect differential operational policies following the failed bid. Our results are most consistent with cash bids revealing prior undervaluation of the target We reconcile our findings with the opposite conclusion in earlier literature (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983) by identifying a look-ahead bias built into their sample construction. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:92 / 106
页数:15
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