Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

被引：30

作者：

Baujard, Antoinette ^{[1
]}

Igersheim, Herrade ^{[2
,3
]}

Lebon, Isabelle ^{[4
,5
]}

Gavrel, Frederic ^{[4
,5
]}

Laslier, Jean-Francois ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ St Etienne, Univ Lyon, UMR CNRS 5824, GATE L SE, St Etiennne, France

[2] Univ Strasbourg, CNRS, Strasbourg, France

[3] Univ Strasbourg, UMR CNRS 7522, BETA, Strasbourg, France

[4] Univ Caen Basse Normandie, CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, Caen, France

[5] Univ Caen Basse Normandie, Condorcet Ctr, Caen, France

[6] Paris Sch Econ, CNRS, UMR CNRS 8545, Paris, France

来源：

ELECTORAL STUDIES | 2014年 / 34卷

关键词：

Voting; In situ experiment; Evaluative voting; Approval voting; Two-round system; FIELD EXPERIMENT; APPROVAL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors "exclusive" candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor "inclusive" candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：131 / 145

页数：15

共 37 条

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