Chief Executive Officer Inside Debt Holdings and Labor Investment Efficiency

被引：6
作者：
Mo, Kyoungwon [1 ]
Kim, Young Jin [2 ]
Park, Kyung Jin [3 ]
机构：
[1] Chung Ang Univ, Sch Business Adm, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Hawaii Pacific Univ, Coll Business, Honolulu, HI USA
[3] Myongji Univ, Coll Business Adm, 34 Geobukgol Ro, Seoul 03674, South Korea
来源：
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2019年 / 48卷 / 04期
关键词：
Inside debt; CEO pension; Labor investment; Agency problem; Financial liquidity; Long-term survival; PROPENSITY SCORE; CEO AGE; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; QUALITY; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; RISKINESS; EQUITY;
D O I：
10.1111/ajfs.12269
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We show how chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings affect corporations' labor investment behavior. We empirically find a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings shown to increase their conservatism and long-term horizons due to deferred payments and labor investment efficiency recognized as an integral factor in a firm's long-term survival and growth. Additional analyses reveal that CEO inside debt holdings lead to a greater tendency to reduce net hiring amid excess labor availability than is observed when levels are optimal. This tendency is especially marked when CEO power is strong and when the firm has relatively high financial liquidity and leverage.
引用
收藏
页码：476 / 502
页数：27
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