Promotion incentives for local officials and the expansion of urban construction land in China: Using the Yangtze River Delta as a case study

被引:107
作者
Chen, Zhigang [1 ,2 ]
Tang, Jing [1 ]
Wan, Jiayu [1 ]
Chen, Yi [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ, Sch Geog & Oceanog Sci, 163 Xianlin Ave, Nanjing 210023, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Minist Land & Resources China, Key Lab Coastal Zone Exploitat & Protect, 58 Shuiximeng Rd, Nanjing 210017, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Promotion incentive; Local officials; Urban expansion; Construction land; China; DRIVING FORCES; ECONOMIC TRANSITION; POLICY; GOVERNMENT; PATTERNS; GROWTH; URBANIZATION; FINANCE; GIS;
D O I
10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.01.034
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
China's promotion incentive is the main motivation behind local officials' decisions regarding the expansion of urban construction land, and is therefore crucial to understanding the mechanism behind the expansion of urban construction land. This paper discusses the promotion incentive's theoretical influence on urban construction land expansion. Then, using 25 cities in the Yangtze River Delta region (including Shanghai and prefecture-level cities in the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang) as samples, we estimate two econometric models that reflect the relationship between local officials' characteristics and changes in the scale and efficiency of urban construction land to test the specific influence of different local officials on the expansion of urban construction land when driven by the promotion incentive. Our results show that the promotion sources of local officials and their terms in office significantly impact changes in the urban construction land scale and utilization efficiency. We also found that the ages of local officials significantly impact the efficiency of urban construction land use, but have an insignificant impact on the expansion of urban construction land. Considering China's unique administrative system, the promotion incentive has a definite but divergent influence on mayors and municipal party secretaries regarding urban expansion. This paper concludes with policy proposals to improve the administrative management system and regulation on urban construction land expansion. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:214 / 225
页数:12
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