The efficiency of competing vertical chains with network externalities

被引：8
|
作者：
Lee, DongJoon [1 ]
Choi, Kangsik [2 ]
机构：
[1] Nagoya Univ Commerce & Business, Fac Commerce, 4-4 Sagamine,Komenoki Cho, Nisshin, Aichi 4700193, Japan
[2] Pusan Natl Univ, Grad Sch Int Studies, Busandaehak Ro 63 Beon Gil 2, Pusan 46241, South Korea
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2018年 / 168卷
基金：
日本学术振兴会;
关键词：
Network effects; Competition effects; Strategic substitutes; PRODUCERS COMPETITION; DELEGATION; COMPATIBILITY; SEPARATION; RESTRAINTS; ECONOMICS; PRICE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.019
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper compares vertical integration and vertical separation with network externalities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, if network effects are stronger than the threshold level of the network externality parameter, manufacturers' strategic choices of wholesale prices move in opposite directions (i.e., wholesale prices may be strategic substitutes under Bertrand competition). Second, if the strength of network effects is strong enough, both profits and outputs are larger under vertical separation than under integration. Finally, if network effects are strong (weak), outputs (wholesale prices, retail prices), consumer surplus, and social welfare are higher (lower) under separation than integration. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：1 / 5
页数：5
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