Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation

被引:99
作者
Bikhchandani, Sushil [1 ]
Chatterji, Shurojit
Lavi, Ron
Mu'alem, Ahuva
Nisan, Noam
Sen, Arunava
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[2] ITAM, Ctr Invest Econ, Mexico City 10700, DF, Mexico
[3] CALTECH, Social & Informat Sci Lab, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[4] Bar Ilan Univ, Dept Comp Sci, IL-52900 Ramat Gan, Israel
[5] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Engn & Comp Sci, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
关键词
dominant-strategy implementation; multi-object auctions;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.
引用
收藏
页码:1109 / 1132
页数:24
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