Price and quality decisions in dual-channel supply chains

被引:315
作者
Chen, Jingxian [1 ]
Liang, Liang [2 ]
Yao, Dong-Qing [3 ]
Sun, Shengnan [4 ]
机构
[1] Nantong Univ, Sch Business, 9 Seyuan Rd, Nantong 226019, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, 96 Jinzhai Rd, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China
[3] Towson Univ, Coll Business & Econ, Dept E Business & Technol Management, Towson, MD 21252 USA
[4] Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Inst Syst Engn, Sipailou 2, Nanjing 210096, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Dual-channel supply chain; Pricing; Product quality; Pareto zone; Game theory; PRODUCT QUALITY; COMPETITION; COORDINATION; ONLINE; CONFLICT; DESIGN; PROFITABILITY; ENCROACHMENT; INFORMATION; PROFITS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2016.11.016
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Since the decision of non-price feature such as product quality draws a little attention in the literature of dual-channel supply chains, this paper investigates price and quality decisions in dual-channel supply chains, in which a single product is delivered through a retail channel, a direct channel, or a dual channel with both retail and direct channels. Considering the supply chains can be centralized or decentralized, we demonstrate that quality improvement can be realized when a new channel is introduced. Moreover, we employ two themes in terms of channel-adding Pareto zone to characterize the impacts of channel structures on supply-chain performance, including the whole system's profit (for the centralized system), each player's profit (for the decentralized system), and consumer surplus. When price and quality decisions are considered, we find the supply chain performance could be improved due to a new channel augmented. Moreover, we show the effects of the quality sensitivity parameters of different channels on price and product quality, as well as profits and consumer surplus. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:935 / 948
页数:14
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