Automated negotiation from declarative contract descriptions

被引:8
作者
Reeves, DM
Wellman, MP
Grosof, BN
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Artificial Intelligence Lab, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
e-commerce; auctions; electronic contracting; automated negotiation; rule-based programming; declarative knowledge representation; situated courteous logic programs;
D O I
10.1111/1467-8640.00199
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Our approach for automating the negotiation of business contracts proceeds in three broad steps. First, determine the structure of the negotiation process by applying general know ledge about auctions and domain-specific knowledge about the contract subject along with preferences from potential buyers and sellers, Second translate the determined negotiation structure into an operational specification for an auction platform. Third, after the negotiation has completed, map the negotiation results to a final contract. We have implemented a prototype which supports these steps by employing a declarative specification (in courteous logic programs) of (1) high-level knock ledge about alternative negotiation structures, (2) general-case rules about auction parameters. (3) rules to map the auction parameters to a specific auction platform, and (4) special-case rules for subject domains, We demonstrate the flexibility of this approach by automatically generating several alternative negotiation structures for the domain of travel shopping in a trading agent competition.
引用
收藏
页码:482 / 500
页数:19
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