Financial frictions and policy cooperation: A case with monopolistic banking and staggered loan contracts

被引：4

作者：

Fujiwara, Ippei ^{[1
,2
]}

Teranishi, Yuki ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Keio Univ, Fac Econ, Tokyo, Japan

[2] Australian Natl Univ, Crawford Sch Publ Policy, Canberra, ACT, Australia

[3] Keio Univ, Fac Business & Commerce, Tokyo, Japan

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 104卷

关键词：

Monetary policy in open economies; Financial frictions; Linear quadratic problem; OPTIMAL MONETARY-POLICY; REAL EXCHANGE-RATE; RATE PASS-THROUGH; INFLATION STABILIZATION; BUSINESS CYCLES; CREDIT; PRICES; COMPETITION; WELFARE; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.09.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Do financial frictions call for cross-border policy cooperation? This paper investigates the implications of financial frictions in the form of staggered loan contracts supplied by monopolistic banks, for monetary policy. Using the linear quadratic (LQ) framework, we show that policy cooperation yields long-run gains in addition to gains from stabilizing inefficient fluctuations over the business cycle, as usually found in models with price rigidities. The Ramsey optimal steady states differ between cooperation and noncooperation. Such gains from cooperation arise irrespective of capital account liberalization. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：19 / 43

页数：25

共 61 条

[1] Banking Competition, Housing Prices and Macroeconomic Stability [J].