Asymmetrical Multi-path Selection Game for Wireless Overlay Networks

In order to transfer the increasing big data we need to make use of multiple wireless paths. Overlay networks provide the possibility of taking advantage of multiple available routing paths to realize the bandwidth aggregating. We present a game-theoretic study of the selfish strategic collaboration of multiple heterogeneous overlays when they are allowed to use massively-multipath transfer. Overlays are modeled as players in this multipath selection game model, we discuss the asymmetric case where all overlays have the different round trip times (RTT) and different wastefulness level, and demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium (NE). Then we find overlays differing only in their RTTs still receive equal throughput shares and utilities at the NE. However, if overlays differ only in their wastefulness levels, a more wasteful overlay has a larger utility and a larger throughput (bandwidth) share than a less wasteful overlay.