Interaction of Interest between Village Cadres and Villagers in the Evaluation of Rural Development Projects

被引：0

作者：

Sun, Fujiang ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Int Relat, Dept Publ Management, Beijing 100091, Peoples R China

来源：

2016 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT HUMAN-MACHINE SYSTEMS AND CYBERNETICS (IHMSC), VOL. 1 | 2016年

关键词：

Rural development project; village cadres; villagers; evaluation agency; interaction game; income;

D O I：

10.1109/IHMSC.2016.67

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

From the game theory point of view, this paper begins with an examination of the game relationship between village cadres and its villagers in the evaluation of rural development project, and proceeds to build a mathematical model to analyze factors influencing the income of village cadres and villagers. It concludes that there is an interest constraint relationship between village cadres and villagers, which influences what strategies village cadres and villages may choose, and that there is a collusive relationship between village cadres and villagers in the evaluation of the rural development project - which affects the quality evaluation of the project and puts the project donor's interest at risk.

引用

页码：559 / 562

页数：4