The intentionality of smell

被引：16
作者：
Lycan, William G. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ N Carolina, Dept Philosophy, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
[2] Univ Connecticut, Dept Philosophy, Storrs, CT USA
来源：
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY | 2014年 / 5卷
关键词：
smell; intentionality; representation; olfaction; objects;
D O I：
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00436
中图分类号：
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号：
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要：
If any sense modality represents, vision does, but argument is needed to show that smell does. This paper rebuts two reasons for doubting that smell represents, and offers several arguments that it does. The paper then considers several recent proposals as to exactly what a smell represents, and defends a version of the author's original proposal-that a smell represents a miasma in the air-against its competitors.
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页数：8
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