Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

被引：6

作者：

Rachmilevitch, Shiran ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, IL-31905 Haifa, Israel

来源：

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2014年 / 42卷 / 03期

关键词：

Bargaining; Efficiency; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; NONCONVEX PROBLEMS; INDEPENDENCE; CONVEXITY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.orl.2014.04.002

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash's axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive analogous results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：246 / 249

页数：4