Grandfathering and coal plant emissions: the cost of cleaning up the Clean Air Act

被引:22
作者
Ackerman, F [1 ]
Biewald, B
White, D
Woolf, T
Moomaw, W
机构
[1] Tufts Univ, Medford, MA 02155 USA
[2] Synapse Energy Econ Inc, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
grandfathering; coal plants; emissions trading;
D O I
10.1016/S0301-4215(99)00086-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The Clean Air Act imposes much stricter emission Limits on new coal-burning power plants than on older ones - a practice that has no obvious theoretical justification. Elimination of "grandfather rules", i.e., applying new plant standards to the US electric industry as a whole, would eliminate 40% of nationwide SO2 emissions and 15% of NOx emissions, while raising average retail electricity rates by only 4%. Under this scenario, 94% or more of existing coal plants would remain economically competitive with new gas-fired power plants. Policy options for elimination of grandfathering include: an explicit requirement that each existing plant meet new-plant standards; a "cap and trade" system of emission allowances similar to the current SO2 trading system; and a generation performance standard, an interesting new variant on emissions trading which incorporates a more equitable and flexible allocation of allowances. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:929 / 940
页数:12
相关论文
共 17 条
[1]  
ACKERMAN F, 1997, ELECT J, V10, P61, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1040-6190(97)80472-1
[2]  
[Anonymous], YALE J REGUL
[3]   PREDATION THROUGH REGULATION - THE WAGE AND PROFIT EFFECTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL-SAFETY-AND-HEALTH-ADMINISTRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION-AGENCY [J].
BARTEL, AP ;
THOMAS, LG .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1987, 30 (02) :239-264
[4]  
BIEWALD B, 1997, ELECT J, V9
[5]  
Biewald B., 1998, Grandfathering and environmental comparability: An economic analysis of air emission regulations and electricity market distortions
[6]  
*EIA, 1997, DOEEIA038398
[7]  
*EIA, 1997, DOEEIA0582
[8]  
*EPA, 1996, ANAL EL POW GEN CLEA
[9]  
GOODE R, 1987, NATL TAX J, V40, P159
[10]   GOVERNMENT RELIEF FOR RISK ASSOCIATED WITH GOVERNMENT ACTION [J].
KAPLOW, L .
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1992, 94 (04) :525-541