When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality

被引:153
作者
Svensson, J [1 ]
机构
[1] World Bank, Dev Res Grp, DECRG, MG, Washington, DC 20433 USA
关键词
aid policy; credibility; policy design;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00061-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Disbursements of foreign aid are guided tin part) by the needs of the poor. Anticipating this, recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor, In principle. conditionality could partly solve the problem, but this requires a strong commitment ability by the donor. Without such a commitment technology, aid will be allocated (partly) to those in most need, and the recipient governments will exert low effort in alleviating poverty. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the aid literature, we show that tied project aid and delegation of part of the aid budget to an (international) agency with less aversion to poverty improve welfare of the poor in the recipient countries. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: E61; F35.
引用
收藏
页码:61 / 84
页数:24
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