The Fixed-Price Contract: A Challenge for the Software Development Project

被引:1
作者
Gaebert, Cornelia [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Munster, Res Grp Strateg Informat Management, European Res Ctr Informat Syst, Leonardo Campus 11, D-48149 Munster, Germany
来源
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES, ICSOFT 2014 | 2015年 / 555卷
关键词
Software development project; Outsourcing; Failure; Information asymmetry; Dilemma structures; Incomplete contract; HYBRID CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-319-25579-8_6
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Describing the software development project between customer and supplier at the contracting level as interaction of the involved organizations in terms of game theory, we can show that the parties are in a dilemma situation regarding the effort for closing the gaps of incomplete requirement specifications. Incomplete, ambiguous, and changing requirements are the number one reason for failure of software development projects. Customer and supplier have to interchange information for closing requirement gaps. However, gathering and interchanging information generates undesirable costs. The most commonly used contract model is a fixed-price contract. Under this condition, the supplier is forced to cooperate, whereas the customer prefers to defect regarding closing requirement gaps. In support of our theoretical argument, we carried out an empirical investigation. We derive suggestions for improving the fixed-price contract design of software development projects as well as for the cooperation behavior during the project.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 112
页数:16
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