A group bargaining solution

被引:34
作者
Chae, S
Heidhues, P
机构
[1] Wissensch Zentrum Berlin Sozialforsch gGmbH, D-10785 Berlin, Germany
[2] Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77005 USA
关键词
group bargaining; nash bargaining solution; joint-bargaining paradox; axiomatic bargaining solution; coalitions;
D O I
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.11.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We propose a solution for bargaining models where groups of individuals bargain with each other. The solution constitutes a Nash solution within as well as across groups. An individual may be worse off bargaining as a member of a group than bargaining alone (the joint-bargaining paradox) in a pure-bargaining situation. It can be, however, profitable to bargain as a group in a non-pure bargaining situation. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:37 / 53
页数:17
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