Detection of man-in-the-middle attacks using physical layer wireless security techniques

被引:19
作者
Wang, Le [1 ]
Wyglinski, Alexander M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Worcester Polytech Inst, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Worcester, MA 01609 USA
关键词
IEEE; 802; 11; wireless LANs; man-in-the-middle attack; rogue AP; RSSI analysis;
D O I
10.1002/wcm.2527
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Compared with a wired network, a wireless network is not protected by the cable transmission medium. Information is broadcasted over the air and it can be intercepted by anyone within the transmission range. Even though the transmissions could potentially be protected by security authentication mechanisms, malicious users can still intercept the information by mimicking the characteristics of normal user or a legitimate access point. This scenario is referred as a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. In the MITM attack, the attackers can bypass the security mechanisms, intercept the unprotected transmission packets, and sniff the information. Because of several vulnerabilities in the IEEE 802.11 protocol, it is difficult to defend against a wireless MITM attack. In this paper, a received signal strength indicator (RSSI)-based detection mechanism for MITM attacks is proposed. RSSI information is an arbitrary integer that indicates the power level being received by the antenna. The random RSSI values are processed via a sliding window, yielding statistic information about the signal characteristics such as mean and standard deviation profiles. By analyzing those profiles, the detection mechanism can detect if a rogue access point, the key component of an MITM attack, is launched. Our proposed approach has been validated via hardware experimentation using Backtrack 5 tools and MATLAB software suite. Copyright (c) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:408 / 426
页数:19
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