Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment

被引：1

作者：

Conrads, Julian ^{[1
]}

Reggiani, Tommaso ^{[1
,2
]}

Rilke, Rainer Michael ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cologne, Dept Corp Dev & Business Eth, D-50931 Cologne, Germany

[2] Univ Cologne, DFG Res Grp Design & Behav, D-50931 Cologne, Germany

来源：

APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2016年 / 23卷 / 03期

关键词：

Ambiguity; lottery; field experiment; FINANCE PUBLIC-GOODS; PAY;

D O I：

10.1080/13504851.2015.1066480

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Ambiguity about the chances of winning represents a key aspect in lotteries. By means of a controlled field experiment, we exogenously vary the degree of ambiguity about the winning chances of lotteries organized to incentivize the contribution for a public good. In one treatment, people have been simply informed about the maximum number of potential participants (i.e. the number of lottery tickets released). In a second treatment, this information has been omitted as in all traditional lotteries. Our general finding shows that simply reducing the degree of ambiguity of the lottery leads to a sizable and significant increase (67%) in the participation rate. This result is robust to alternative prize configurations.

引用

页码：206 / 211

页数：6

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