Frequency shift attack on 'plug-and-play' quantum key distribution systems

Many imperfections in a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system have been exploited by an eavesdropper (Eve) to attack the system. However, most of these attacks will introduce perturbations to the system while collecting information about the key. For example, the phase-remapping attack [Phys. Rev. A2007,75, 032314], in which Eve performs time shift on the signal pulse from the constant acting range of the phase modulation voltage to its rising edge to introduce an imperfection, results in an quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 14.6%, which is too high and will be discovered by careful users. In this paper, a frequency shift (FS) attack on plug-and-play' QKD systems with phase-coding BB84 protocol is proposed, in which Eve introduces an imperfection by the same method as she used in the phase-remapping attack. The most novel advantage of our FS attack is that Eve can get full information without introducing detectable QBER, which is more deceptive than the phase-remapping attack.