Inside or outside? The politics of family and medical leave

被引:2
作者
Bernstein, A [1 ]
机构
[1] HARVARD UNIV,DEPT GOVT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1541-0072.1997.tb00008.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The efforts of interest groups to pass family and medical leave policies are illustrative of a dilemma confronting advocates of policy innovation. Faced with strong opposition from business lobbies and in many cases reluctant legislatures and veto-wielding executives, proponents of family and medical leave had to balance their desire to pass the policy they wanted against their desire to pass a policy. This study examines the family and medical leave policy process at the federal level and in three illustrative states. The study finds that coalitions of ''insiders'' are more likely To get family and medical leave policies enacted both because they have more political clout and because they are more likely to propose moderate bills and to be willing to compromise. However, the policies enacted by the insider coalitions generally cater barely half the population and are unpaid. This lends credibility to the arguments of members of ''outsider'' groups that there is a value in proposing more wide-ranging policies.
引用
收藏
页码:87 / 99
页数:13
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