Oligopolistic equilibrium analysis for electricity markets: A nonlinear complementarity approach

被引:93
作者
Wang, X [1 ]
Li, YZ [1 ]
Zhang, SH [1 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Shanghai, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions; Nash equilibrium; nonlinear complementarity method; supply function equilibrium;
D O I
10.1109/TPWRS.2004.831237
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Oligopolistic equilibrium models are widely used in electricity market analysis, among which the supply function equilibrium model has been chosen as the basis of many power market models. A nonlinear complementarity approach has been proposed in this paper to calculate the Nash supply function equilibrium for a bid-based-pool generation market with a de transmission model. A mixed nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) is presented by combining the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of all strategic generating firms. Using a special nonlinear complementarity function, the mixed NCP is reformulated as a set of nonlinear algebraic equations and thus can be solved by an inexact Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. Numerical examples are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. The results show that the generating firms could exercise their market power by over-production under congestion, or by capacity withholding in case of power shortage. The approach developed in this paper provides an efficient way to the solution of large-scale, complicated equilibrium models for electricity markets.
引用
收藏
页码:1348 / 1355
页数:8
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