Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk

被引：41

作者：

Baliga, S

Morris, S

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 105卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

incomplete information; Nash equilibrium; Bayesian equilibrium; cheap talk;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2855

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).

引用

页码：450 / 468

页数：19

共 11 条

[1]

Aumann R.J., 1990, EC DECISION MAKING G

[2]

BALIGA S, 1998, CHEAP TALK COORDINAT

[3] A BATTLE-OF-THE-SEXES GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].