Contest with pre-contest investment

被引：10

作者：

Fu, Qiang ^{[1
]}

Lu, Jingfeng ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Business Policy, Singapore 117592, Singapore

[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 119260, Singapore

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 103卷 / 03期

关键词：

Contest; Pre-contest investment; Preemptive incentive; Shortlisting; Effort supply; PROCUREMENT; DESIGN; ENTRY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2009.03.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a standard noisy contest, more competition (more contestants) leads to lower individual equilibrium effort. We show that when contestants can make pre-contest investment to enhance their competency, neither equilibrium investment nor individual effort is monotonic in the number of contestants. Individual effort may increase with the level of participation. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：142 / 145

页数：4

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