Sellars and Quine on empiricism and conceptual truth

被引：2

作者：

Brandt, Stefan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Friedrich Alexander Univ Erlangen Nurnberg FAU, Inst Philosophie, Erlangen, Germany

来源：

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY | 2017年 / 25卷 / 01期

关键词：

Sellars; Quine; empiricism; myth of the given; analytic-synthetic distinction;

D O I：

10.1080/09608788.2016.1225566

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

I compare Sellars's criticism of the 'myth of the given' with Quine's criticism of the 'two dogmas' of empiricism, that is, the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine's and Sellars's views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars's arguments against the 'myth of the given' are incompatible with Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction.

引用

页码：108 / 132

页数：25