CEO power and audit fees: Evidence from Malaysia

被引：10

作者：

Tee, Chwee Ming ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Tunku Abdul Rahman Univ Coll, Fac Accountancy Finance & Business, 77 Lorong Lembah Permai Tiga, Tanjong Bungah 11200, Penang, Malaysia

[2] Monash Univ Malaysia, Sch Business Accounting & Finance, Jalan Lagoon Selatan, Sunway, Selangor, Malaysia

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING | 2019年 / 23卷 / 03期

关键词：

audit fees; CEO power; family ownership; political connection; FOUNDING-FAMILY OWNERSHIP; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; EMERGING MARKETS; AGENCY COSTS; EARNINGS; IMPACT; COMPENSATION; ACCRUALS;

D O I：

10.1111/ijau.12166

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) power and audit fees, and whether this association is influenced by family ownership and political connections. The results show that CEO power is associated with lower audit fees, consistent with alignment incentive effect. However, this relationship is attenuated by political connections and family ownership. Whereas the overall findings suggest that audit fees are affected by CEO power, its association is largely influenced by key institutional settings in an emerging market setting.

引用

页码：365 / 386

页数：22

共 83 条

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