Interaction between populations promotes cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma

被引:22
作者
Shi, Juan [1 ,2 ]
Hu, Die [1 ,2 ]
Tao, Rui [1 ,2 ]
Peng, Yunchen [1 ,2 ]
Li, Yong [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Jinzhuo [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Yunnan Univ, Sch Software, Kunming 650091, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[2] Key Lab Software Engn Yunnan Prov, Kunming 650091, Yunnan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Cooperation; Voluntary prisoner's dilemma; Population; NETWORK RECIPROCITY; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2020.125728
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
The coexistence of different populations has recently been confirmed to be a simple yet effective mechanism to understand the stability of cooperation. Based on this intuition, we use the voluntary prisoner's dilemma (VPD) game as the mathematical model to explore the spatiotemporal dynamics of cooperation among different populations. By using parameter alpha as a key quantity that takes into account the strength of connections between populations, we observe that a fascinating spiral pattern is spontaneously formed, adding a new population always brings additional prey to cooperators in other populations, leading to competing spatial dynamics and pattern formation. Moreover, the system gradually changes from the C + D + L state to the C + D state and finally to the full C state. The inherent cyclic dominance of the strategies results in the self-organization of populations on the square lattice and ultimately effectively promotes cooperation. Our work emphasizes that the complexity of the evolutionary dynamics of structural populations is significantly increased by the simultaneous existence of different populations. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:7
相关论文
共 53 条
[1]   Based on mathematical epidemiology and evolutionary game theory, which is more effective: quarantine or isolation policy? [J].
Alam, Muntasir ;
Kabir, K. M. Ariful ;
Tanimoto, Jun .
JOURNAL OF STATISTICAL MECHANICS-THEORY AND EXPERIMENT, 2020, 2020 (03)
[2]   A game theoretic approach to discuss the positive secondary effect of vaccination scheme in an infinite and well-mixed population [J].
Alam, Muntasir ;
Tanaka, Masaki ;
Tanimoto, Jun .
CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2019, 125 :201-213
[3]   Three-strategy and four-strategy model of vaccination game introducing an intermediate protecting measure [J].
Alam, Muntasir ;
Kuga, Kazuki ;
Tanimoto, Jun .
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION, 2019, 346 :408-422
[4]   Various error settings bring different noise-driven effects on network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma [J].
Alam, Muntasir ;
Nagashima, Keisuke ;
Tanimoto, Jun .
CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2018, 114 :338-346
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2014, J STAT MECH THEORY E, DOI DOI 10.1155/2014/960628
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2015, J STAT MECH THEORY E, DOI DOI 10.1093/PTEP/PTV066
[7]   THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J].
AXELROD, R ;
HAMILTON, WD .
SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) :1390-1396
[8]   Promotion of cooperation by selective group extinction [J].
Boettcher, Marvin A. ;
Nagler, Jan .
NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS, 2016, 18
[9]   Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game [J].
Chu, Chen ;
Zhai, Yao ;
Mu, Chunjiang ;
Hu, Die ;
Li, Tong ;
Shi, Lei .
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION, 2019, 362
[10]  
Darwin Charles, 1968, ORIGIN SPECIES MEANS, P502