RATIONAL CREDENCE THROUGH REASONING

被引：0

作者：

Dogramaci, Sinan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT | 2018年 / 18卷 / 11期

关键词：

DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES; COUNTEREXAMPLE; REPRESENTATION; PROBABILITY; INTERNALISM; PSYCHOLOGY; ARGUMENTS; JUDGMENT;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.

引用

页码：1 / 25

页数：25

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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2014, 169 (01) :1-18

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